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Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

Diehl Lumber v. Mickelson, et al.
Case No. 890179-CA

Dear Ms. Noonan:
This firm represents the appellants in the above-referenced
matter. This letter is sent pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Rules
of the Utah Court of Appeals*
In addition to the authorities cited at page 23 of their
opening brief and pages 15 through 17 of their reply brief, the
appellants have discovered additional authorities.
Those
authorities are as follows: Harris v. Multicon Properties. 326
So. 2d 43 (Fla. App. 1976); Muehlfelt v. Vleck, 250 N. E. 2d 14
(111. App. 1969); and Rogeyg QQnqr<$%qt Jn<?t vT Jy$Q gQritraptQrg,
550 P. 2d 892 (Colo. 1976).
The judgment in this matter was signed on January 26, 1989.
The docketing statement was filed thereafter and briefing was
completed by the end of September, 1989. A central issue at
trial was whether or not Mickelson' s lien had priority over the
interests of the appellants. Seven findings of fact (14 through
20) and two conclusions of law (8 and 9) were devoted to this
issue. Based upon the law that existed in this state at the time
the docketing statement was filed and briefing was completed, the
appellant did not raise as an issue on appeal the question of
lien priority.
Subsequent to the time that briefing was
completed, the Court of Appeals decided the case of Ketchum,

KppHeli B&rgQtti et alt Vt Heritage Mountain Development Co T , 784
P. 2d 1217 (Utah App. 1989).

The appellants believe that the

Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court
March 8, 1990
Page Two
Heritage Mountain case, applied to the findings of the trial
court, is dispositive of the appeal. The appellants would have
raised the issue of priority in the docketing statement and on
appeal had Heritage Mountain been decided previously. In fact,
the major focus of the appeal would have been on the Heritage
Mountain decision. The appellant relies further upon the case of
Meier v. Ross General Hospital. 445 P. 2d 519 (Cal. 1968) as
authority for this court to consider the effect of the Heritage
Mountain case on this appeal.
Very truly yours,
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL

(uA

Keith W. Meade
KWM/da
cc:

M. Richard Walker
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This matter was appealed from a final judgment in the Third
District Court entered after a trial to the court in the Third
District Court, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding.
judgment

was

appealed

U. C. A. §78-2-2 (j).

to

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

pursuant

The
to

The appeal was poured-over to the Court of

Appeals by the Supreme Court pursuant to an order dated March 24,
1989.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in determining that Mickelson' s

lien foreclosure action was commenced in a timely manner with
respect to Diehl Lumber Transportation?
2.

Did the trial court err in determining that Mickelson' s

lien foreclosure action was commenced in a timely manner with
respect to Zions First National Bank?
3.

Did the trial court err in its entry of a Nunc Pro Tunc

order?
4.

Did the trial court err in determining that the work

performed by Mickelson was lienable?
5.

Is the Utah Mechanic' s Lien statute unconstitutional on

its face as a taking of property without due process, violative
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution?

1

RELEVANT STATUTES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.C.A. §38-1-11 (1987):
38-1-11.
Enforcement - Time for - Lis
Pendens - Action for debt not affected.
Actions to enforce the liens herein
provided for must be begun within twelve
months after the completion of the original
contract, or the suspension of work
thereunder for a period of thirty days.
Within the twelve months herein mentioned the
lien claimant shall file for record with the
county recorder of each county in which the
lien is recorded a notice of the pendency of
the action, in the manner provided in actions
affecting the title or right to possession of
real property, or the lien shall be void,
except as to persons who have been made
parties to the action and persons having
actual knowledge of the commencement of the
action, and the burden of proof shall be upon
the lien claimant and those claiming under
him to show such actual knowledge.
Nothing
herein contained shall be construed to
impair or affect the right of any person to
whom a debt may be due for any work done or
materials furnished to maintain a personal
action to recover the same.
Art. 1, Sec. 7, . Utah Constitution:
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of
law.
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution:
Section 1.

Citizens of the United States.

All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside.
No
State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any
2

State deprive anv person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. (Emphasis
added. )

3

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
AND
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This
Facts,

action presents,

the determination

foreclose

as

forth

of whether

mechanic7 s lien

a

set

in

the

Mickelson

against

is

property

Statement

of

entitled

to

owned

by

Diehl

Lumber Transportation.
1.

This

action

revolves

around

claims

related

to

a

building located in Murray, Utah, referred to as the "Comtel"
building.
2.

(Finding of Fact 1, R. 580. )
The

Corporation.

building

was

owned

and

constructed

Mickelson was hired by Heritage.

by

Heritage

(Findings of Fact

2, 5, R. 580, the Contract is at R. 41. )
3.

The

(R. 360.)

construction

lender was

Zions First National Bank

American

West Mortgage.

(Zions) and Diehl Lumber

Transportation, Inc. (Diehl) held their interest through American
West Mortgage' s trust deed.

(Tr.

270. ) Diehl was the record

owner of the property when the action was commenced.

(Finding of

Fact 12; R. 441. )
4.
filed

This action commenced on October 28, 1986 when Diehl
a

complaint

seeking

a

restraining

order

to

prevent

Mickelson from entering the Comtel building and removing property
which Mickelson had installed.
5.
(para.

Mickelson

answered

(R. 4. )
and

counterclaimed,

alleging

that

6) he retained title to the materials he had installed

because he had not been paid.

Mickelson prayed for authority to

enter the building to remove the materials he had installed and,
4

in the alternative, for a money judgment.
6.

On November

(R. 11-14. )

12, 1986, Mickelson filed a "Motion for

Writ of Replevin," alleging that he "has installed various items
of personal property and fixtures into

[the Comtel building]."

(R. 21. )

Mickelson' s motion was granted and the order signed on

December

26,

1986.

(R.

75,

76. )

Replevin issued on March 24, 1987.
7.

The

Prejudgment

Writ

of

(R. 84, 85. )

On June 12, 1987, Mickelson filed, without prior leave

of the court, a (proposed) third party complaint seeking for the
first

time

Comtel,

to

foreclose

American

West

a mechanic' s lien

and

Zions.

(R.

against

97, second

Heritage,
cause

of

action).
8.
states

Mickelson' s lien was recorded on August 21, 1986 and
that

05/15/86."
9.

"Last

Labor/Material

provided

No dollar amount is set forth in the lien.

about:

(R. 107. )

Mickelson' s Notice of Hearing

set the motion for a June 29, 1987 hearing.
29,

or

On June 18, 1987, Mickelson filed a "Motion for Leave

to File Third Party Complaint. "

June

on

(R. 116, 119.)

On

1987, the court entered a minute entry stating that

"Based on the Defendant's

Motion Court orders

the Defendant's

Motion for Leave to File Third Party Complaint be continued to
July 6, 1987 at 2:00 p.m."
July 6, 1987.

(R. 126.)

No hearing occurred on

On November 25, 1987, the court entered a Nunc Pro

Tunc Order reflecting that Mickelson's motion "came on regularly
for hearing on the 29th day of June, 1987" and that Mickelson "is
hereby granted [sic] to amend and file the Third Party Complaint
5

effective as of the date of filing.,f

herein,

(R.

250, 251. )

This nunc pro tunc order was entered ex parte without any motion
and without notice.
10.

On

It was never served on other counsel.

February

1,

1988, Mickelson

filed

a "Motion

for

Leave to Amend [its] Counterclaim" against Diehl to "conform the
Counterclaim to the issues raised, namely the lien foreclosure
action against the plaintiff, Diehl Lumber Transportation, Inc."
(R. 312. )
1988.

The motion was granted by order dated February 23,

(R. 330. )
11.

After a trial, the court denied Mickelson7s claim that

he had retained a valid security interest (Conclusion of Law 12,
R. 585) in the items he installed, but ordered that Mickelson was
entitled to foreclose his lien as against Zions and Diehl.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The arguments of appellants are summarized as follows:
1.

Mickelson7 s lien

Zions was untimely.

foreclosure

action

with

respect

to

Mickelson did not include any demand in his

original Counterclaim to foreclose the lien which he filed with
respect to the property.

Not until November 25, 1987 was any

order of the court entered permitting Mickelson to commence a
lien

foreclosure

U. C. A.

proceeding

§38-1-11,

the

against

commencement

Zions
of

Bank.
the

proceeding with respect to Zions was untimely.

Pursuant

lien

to

foreclosure

Mickelson' s lien,

filed in August of 1986, stated that the last work for which a
lien was claimed was performed on May 15, 1986.
that

Mickelson

billed

for

with
6

respect

to

the

The last work
project

was

performed on May 19, 1986.

Mickelson testified at trial that he

performed no work after June 2 or 3, 1986 and that on June 10,
1986 he determined not to go back to the project because he was
unpaid.

Under the principles

Development,

714

P. 2d

289

of AAA Fencing Co. v.

(Utah

1986) Mickelson7s

Raintree
right

and

remedies under the lien statute were extinguished prior to the
date of the Order which permitted the filing of the Third Party
Complaint.
Mickelson7 s

2.

Lumber was untimely.

lien

foreclosure

action

against

Diehl

At the time the litigation was commenced,

Diehl Lumber was the record owner of the property.

Diehl Lumber

was not included in the foreclosure action when it was originally
commenced

by

Mickelson.

As

the

fee

owner

of

the

property,

Diehl' s interest could not be foreclosed without it being made a
party to the foreclosure causes of action.

No claim of lien

foreclosure was made against Diehl until a motion for leave to
Mickelson7 s

amend

February

1,

1988.

counterclaim
At

the

was

time

filed

this

with

motion

the
was

court
made,

on
the

limitation period provided in §38-1-11 had long since expired and
any further claims by Mickelson with respect to its lien rights
were

extinguished.

Because

the

action

against

Diehl

was

untimely, Mickelson is not entitled to foreclose his lien against
the property.
3.
testimony

Mickelson7 s work was
of Mickelson

not

at trial was

lienable.

The

that the items

undisputed
which he

installed at the property were readily removable and were not a
7

permanent

part

of

the

property.

At

the

outset

of

the

proceedings, Mickelson was granted a Prejudgment Writ of Replevin
with

respect

manifesting

to

the

the

materials

court's

belief

he

and

had

installed,

Mickelson's

clearly

representation

that the property was personalty and not a permanent part of the
property.

The trial court erred in determining that any of the

work performed or materials installed by Mickelson was lienable.
4.
its

The Utah mechanic' s lien statute is unconstitutional on

face.

At the time of the transactions

relevant

to this

action, the Utah mechanic' s lien statute -did not require that the
lien be verified as to its truthfulness or that an amount claimed
be set forth in the lien.

There is no provision in the lien

statutes for any meaningfully prompt hearing either prior to or
subsequent to the attachment of the lien.

The recording of a

mechanics lien constitutes a constitutionally cognizable taking
of property

under process

of the law.

Because of these due

process deficiencies, the recording of a lien under existing Utah
law

results

violative

of

in
the

a

taking

of

Fourteenth

property
Amendment

without
of

the

due

process,

United

States

Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

8

ARGUMENT
I
THE LIEN FORECLOSURE ACTION WITH RESPECT TO ZIONS WAS UNTIMELY.
This court' s review of this issue requires the consideration
of two factors:

a) from what date does the limitation in §38-1-

11 begin to run, and b) in light of the nunc pro tunc order, what
was

the

date

of

commencement

of the

lien

foreclosure

action

against Zions.
The trial court found,

(F. F. 6, R.

580), that "Mickelson

provided labor . . . until June 10, 1986, at which time work was
suspended by Mickelson . . . [based upon non-payment]."

The

trial court concluded that Mickelson suspended work on June 10,
1986, and that "the last work for which a lien was filed was done
. . . on or about May 19, 1986, although other work was performed
up to June 10, 1986." (C. L. 4, R. 583, 584)
The following

facts are marshalled with respect to these

issues:
1.
last

The lien, which was signed on August 21, 1986, shows

work

on

May

suspension of work.
2.

15,

1986

and

makes

no

reference

to

any

(R. 107. )

Mickelson' s affidavits

filed with the court prior to

trial stated the following:
(a)

In a September 18, 1987 affidavit, (R. 173) that

he performed "labor and materials and services in connection with
the electrical work through and including the 15th day of May . .
. " and that (para. 5, R. 174) "I suspended work on the project on
9

or

about

the

15th

day

of

May,

1986,

the

thirty

day

period

thereafter did not expire until the 14th day of June, 1986. "
(b)
president

On September 20, 1987, the owner's

filed

an

affidavit

prepared

by

(Heritage's)

Mickelson' s

counsel

stating that he knew that Mickelson suspended work based on nonpayment on approximately May 15, 1986.
(c)

(R. 176. )

In a memorandum dated November 3, 1987, (R. 188),

Mickelson asserted that work was suspended on May 15, 1986.
(d)

In a March 17, 1988 motion and memorandum (R. 344,

355) for summary judgment,

Zions advanced the May

15 date as

entitling it to summary judgment under 38-1-11.
(e)
Mickelson

In a responsive affidavit dated April

changed

his

prior

testimony

and

14, 1988,

stated

he

had

"researched records" and that he did work on May 19, 1986, and
that he "waited until June 10, 1986 to determine his course of
action," and until June 10, 1988, he fully intended to proceed
with completion.

(R. 419. )

to was prepared in July, 1986.
3.

(The May 19, 1986 invoice referred
(Tr. 36. ))

At trial, Mickelson testified that the last work he

performed on the job which he charged anyone for was done on May
19,

1986.

(T. 36. )

He testified that after that date he did

some work he did not charge for.

That work consisted of moving

or changing an outlet for a Xerox machine for the tenant and his
installing some elbows and fittings in preparation for wiring an
exterior sign for the tenant (but he did not connect the sign).
(T. 38, 63. )

Mickelson testified that the last free work he did
10

was on June 2 or 3, 1986 (T. 32), and that he did no work after
that date and never completed his work.
4.

On June

12, 1987, Mickelson

(T. 41, 42. )
filed with the clerk a

proposed "Third Party Complaint," which was the first pleading to
assert a claim for lien foreclosure.

(R. 97.)

A "Motion for

Leave to File Third Party Complaint" was filed on June 18, 1987.
(R. 116. ) A hearing was set by Mickelson7 s counsel on the motion
for June 29, 1987.

(R. 119.)

The court's minute entry for June

29 (R. 126) shows that the hearing was continued at Mickelson's
request to July

6,

1987.

There is nothing in the record to

reflect that a hearing was ever held on the motion.

In a letter

to the court dated November 24, 1987, Diehl' s former counsel told
the court that he had advised Mickelson' s counsel in June 1987
that "Diehl would not oppose the Motion . . . "

(R. 252. )

No

written stipulation was ever filed to permit the amendment to
Mickelson' s answer to include the Third Party Complaint and no
order was signed by the court until the trial judge signed a Nunc
Pro

Tunc

Order

dated

November

Mickelson "is hereby granted

25,

1987

which

stated

that

[sic] to amend and file the Third

Party Complaint herein, effective as of date of filing. "

(R.

250. )
In summary, the relevant dates are as follows:
May 13, 1986

last electrical work invoiced,
invoice number 1578, (T. Exh. 2,
also at R. 403. )

May 15, 1986

last date of work stated in
Mickelson lien (R. 107); date
Mickelson suspended work as set
out in pre-trial affidavits. (R.
174. )
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May 19, 1986

date on invoice for installation
of brace for water pipe, billed
one hour - total bill $37.11, no
evidence it was related to
electrical work (Tr. 74, 88. )

May 19-June 3, 1986

Mickelson testified that his last
work of any nature would have
been around June 2 or 3. (T. 32,
1. 12, 13. ) No work after May 19
was billed for.

August 21, 1986

lien recorded. (R. 107)

June 12, 1987

(proposed) third party complaint
filed (R. 97) as against Zions,
first pleading to ask for lien
foreclosure.

June 18, 1987

motion for leave to file a third
party complaint filed (R. 116.)

June 29, 1987

hearing date for motion (R. 119)
and minute entry (R. 12 6. )

November 25, 1987

nunc pro tunc order signed (R.
250) a l l o w i n g
Third
Party
Complaint.

The

(a)
November

25,

Third
1987,

Party
a date

Complaint

was

more

1 year

than

not

"filed"
after

until

work

was

suspended.
Because Mickelson did not file his Third
within ten

(10) days

of his Answer

Party Complaint

and Counterclaim,

he was

required to obtain leave of court by motion to file the Third
Party Complaint.

Rule 14, U. R. C. P.

motion

to

for leave

There is no evidence the

file the third party

complaint

was

ever

heard, and no order was made on the motion until the nunc pro
tunc order of November 25, 1987.
"A motion nunc pro tunc is used to make the record speak the
12

truth; it may not be used to correct the court' s failure to speak
. . .

In other words, the function of a nunc pro tunc order is

not to make an order now for then, but to enter now for then an
order previously made. "

Preece v. Preece, 682 P. 2d 298 at 299

(Utah 1984).
The foregoing authority reveals two fatal flaws with respect
to

the

First,

November
Preece

25,

1987

reflects

order

the requirement

nunc pro tunc order be made.
its entry,

entered

by

the

trial

court.

that a motion for the

No motion was made in this case for

and no notice was ever given that Mickelson would

apply to the Court for such an order, nor was notice given of its
entry, contrary to Rules 5 and 7, U. R. C. P.

In fact, there was

never any notice of any type to other counsel that any nunc pro
tunc matters were before the court.

The order should be stricken

on this basis alone.
Second,
properly

even if a motion for a nunc pro tunc order was

before

the

court,

the

motion

could

not

have

been

properly granted because as stated in Preece the purpose of nunc
pro tunc orders is to make the record speak, to enter now for an
order previously made.

Implicit in this is the need for a prior

order to have been made, i. e. , for the court to have spoken.

In

Preece, there was evidence that the court had actually made an
oral

order

which

was

to

become

final

on

signing.

In this

action, there is no evidence that the court ever made any order
on June 29 or July 6, 1987, except to continue the hearing date.
It is also clear that Diehl did not stipulate to the order.
13

Its

counsel simply indicated that it "would not oppose" the motion.
As such, "a previously made order did not exist and therefore
did not afford the court the right to employ the nunc pro tunc
device. "

(Preece, 682 P. 2d at 300. )

Based on the foregoing authority as applied to this action,
the November 25 order permitting the Third Party Complaint could
not have been effective prior to the time that it came on for
hearing, which it apparently never did, until November 25, 1987,
when the order was entered ex-parte.

At that time, Judge Sawaya

had no authority to enter a nunc pro tunc order.
The November 25, 1987 date was well after the statute of
limitations

had

expired.

On

this

basis

alone,

the

action

against Zions should be dismissed.
(b)

Without

regard

to

the

nunc

pro

tunc

order,

the

foreclosure action was untimely.
Even if the foreclosure action is deemed commenced prior to
November 25, 1987, it was still barred by U. C.A. §38-1-11.
The trial court concluded that "the last work for which a
lien was filed, was done by the [Mickelson] on or about May 19,
1986, although other work was performed up to June 10, 1986."
(C. L. 5, R. 584)

The trial court also concluded that Mickelson

"suspended work11 on the project on June 10, 1986, because he was
not being paid. (C. L. 4, R. 584).
The conclusions which were made are not supportable, either
in law or in fact, for the following reasons.
i)

Last work

on May

19, other work to June
14

10, 1986.

Initially,

there

was

no

evidence

performed work up to June 10.

at

trial

that

Mickelson

Mickelson himself testified that

he did no work of any kind after June 2 or 3.

(T. 32)

The trial court' s decision is unsound for a second reasonnone of the work done after May 15 was lienable.
electrician) testified

that on May

bracket for a water pipe.

Mickelson (an

19 he installed

a support

After May 19, he changed an outlet to

accommodate the tenant7 s Xerox machine, even though the outlet he
had previously installed was the type called for in the plans.
(T. 91)

He also installed (but did not connect) some fittings on

the tenants exterior sign. (T. 38)
this work.

Mickelson gave no dates for

Mickelson did not bill for this work, and kept no

records of when it was actually done.

Work, to extend the time

for either the filing or foreclosing of a lien, must itself be
lienable.

It

must

also

be

agreement and not new work.
672 P. 2d 1224 (Or. App. 1983).

in

furtherance

of

the

original

Central Coast Electric v. Mendell,
The work which Mickelson did after

May 15 was done for the tenant and not the owner. (T. 91)

There

was no evidence that it was part of the original agreement.

It

was work so trivial in nature that even Mickelson did not expect
to be paid for it.

Central Coast, supra.

Another reason why Mickelson should be bound by the May 15
date lies in the invoices themselves.
Exhibit 1) was with Heritage.

Mickelson' s contract (Tr.

Mickelson's last two invoices were

not to Heritage, but to Comtel, the tenant.
1578, part of Trial Exhibit 2. )
15

(Invoices 1588 and

Because the last work (May 13

and May 19) was not part of the original contract, which was with
Heritage, it could not extend the time for foreclosing the lien.
Finally, the lien itself states the last work for which a
claim of lien is made was done on May 15, 1986.
foreclosure proceeding
Mechanics Liens §350.
property.

are proceedings

A lien and the

in rem.

53 Am. Jur. 2d,

They are not directed against people, but

The significance of this is highlighted in this case,

where neither Zions or Diehl had any contractual obligation to
Mickelson nor did they have any involvement in his work.
obligation,

if any, lies in the property itself.

The

Mickelson' s

lien states that the last work for which a lien was claimed was
performed on May 15.
foreclosed on.
court.

It is that lien (R.

107) that is being

It is only that lien claim that was before the

Neither Mickelson nor the court could re-write the lien

at time of trial.

If Mickelson wanted to claim a lien for work

done after May 15, he could have filed an amended lien, so long
as it was done within the time permitted by law.
Mickelson is bound by his lien.
v. Northwestern Bank,
filed

a lien which

November 16, 1972.

220 S. E. 2d 414

He did not.

In Beach & Adams Builders
(N. C.

1975),

stated that it had provided

the builder

last work on

In its complaint to foreclose the lien, the

builder alleged that its actual last date of work was December
12,

1972.

The defendants argued by summary judgment that the

lien claimant should be bound by the contents of its lien, and
that the complaint was untimely.

In response, the lien claimant

filed an affidavit stating that the lien reflected a clerical
16

error and that the last work was indeed done on December 12.

The

court of appeals observed that there was nothing on the lien to
suggest

to a title

examiner that an error had been made and

stated that "Here, no 'fair construction' of the claim as written
would

indicate

to

the

reader

that

the

last

furnishing

was

actually several weeks later than that actually shown on the face
of the Claim of Lien."
and

recognized

(220 S.E. 2d at 414.)

an exception

in instances

The court went on

where

there was

an

obvious error determinable from the lien itself, and concluded
that ". . . barring an obvious error, easily discernible to the
title examiner, the plaintiff is bound by the date stated on his
Claim of Lien. "

Id. at 414.

Mickelson' s attempt at trial to

amend the lien to assert a later date of last work or to claim
that he actually suspended work at an even later date is nothing
more than an untimely effort to amend his lien.

Roberts Invest.

Co. v. Gibbons & Reed Concrete Pr. Co. , 22 Utah 2d 105, 449 P. 2d
116

(1969).

Mickelson should be bound by the lien he filed,

including the date of last work.
Mickelson' s statement in his lien that his last work for the
lien was performed on May 15 is factually and legally correct.
The trial court' s conclusion that the last date of work was June
10 is not supported either in law or by the record.
ii)

The trial court's conclusions on "suspension" are also

incorrect.
Regardless of when the last date of work was, it is clear
that Mickelson must rely on "suspension" to avoid an untimely
17

foreclosure.
Prior to trial, Mickelson' s testimony with regard to when he
suspended work changed to avoid summary judgment on the issue of
the statute of limitations.

(R.

344, 355, 419. )

Initially,

Mickelson said in an affidavit that he suspended work on May 15.
(R. 174, 176, 188.)
this

date,

affidavit,

After Zions sought summary judgment based on

Mickelson
moved

the

changed
date

back

his
to

testimony
June

10.

and

in

a

new

(R.

419. )

In

Mickelson's own mind, "suspension" was a variable term, adaptable
to suit any procedural need.
Long prior to June 10, 1986, Mickelson stopped working and
keeping track of work on the project because he was not being
paid.
160,

He called the owner on a regular basis about payment (T.
161.)

On May 22, 1986, the owner advised the contractors

that the takeout loan had not closed.
When

June

10

arrived,

and

the

loan

(Tr. Exh.
still

Mickelson told the owner he would do no more.

had

5, T.
not

160. )

closed,

(T. 163.)

Suspension, if it occurred at all, occurred long before June
10, 1986.

Suspension is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (4th

Ed. ) as " . . . a temporary stop . . . "

It is not a permanent or

final departure.
Two

Utah

cases

have

addressed

the

issue

of

suspension,

Totorica v. Thomas, 397 P. 2d 984 (Utah 1965) and Mickelson v.

Mickelson must be deemed an "original contractor" in this
action.
U. C. A. §38-1-2.
Mickelson's contract was with the
owner, Heritage. Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 226, 310
P. 2d 517 (1957).
18

Craicrco,

99 U. A. R.

21

(Utah

1989).

In each

case,

the lien

claimant came back and completed its work after suspending work.
In

each

case

the

Court

recognized

that

if

a lien

claimant

suspends work but comes back later to complete it, that the lien
claimant

is

not

required

to

measure

its

time

for

filing

or

foreclosing its lien from the date of suspension, but can wait
until after completion of its work.
define
work.

suspension
This

as a stopping

Implicitly, the cases also

coupled with a restarting of

definition is entirely

consistent with the usual

definition of suspension, as found in Black' s, supra.
Appellants have found no other state lien statutes which use
the term "suspension" as a measuring stick for time.
"suspension" is, however, used in other statutes.

The term

For example,

in Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. v. New Mexico Environ. , et al. , 637
P. 2d 38 at 42 (N. M. 1981) the term is referred to as "nothing
more than a temporary cessation. "
It was clear and undisputed from the testimony at trial that
Mickelson did
after May 15.

no work directed

to his contract with

Heritage

(The May 19 installation of the water pipe brace

cannot reasonably be construed as electrical work. )

The evidence

points only to the conclusion that Mickelson' s last work was on
May 15th.
Any other interpretation ignores both Totorica, supra, and
Mickelson,

supra,

as

well

as

the

normal

meaning

given

to

" suspension. "
A

purely

subjective

standard,
19

which

the

trial

court

apparently adapted, should not be used to define "suspension" for
several reasons.

Initially, it would render §38-1-11 subject to

whatever imagination was necessary to avoid an untimely filing or
foreclosure.

Chicago Lumber Co. v. Merrimack River Sav. Bank. 52

Kan. 410, 34 Pac. 1045 (1893).

This imagination factor is amply

highlighted

Mickelson' s

in

this

case

regarding suspension.
the

notice

aspect

of

by

change

in

testimony

Secondly, a subjective standard defeats
liens.

As

discussed

in

Beach

& Adams

Builders, supra, it is important that title examiners be able to
determine the status of liens from the record.
should

A title examiner

not have to call a lien claimant and ask if his lien

really means what it says.

In this case, Mickelson' s lien stated

last work on May 15, 1986.

It did not refer to suspension.

As

such, people viewing title and the lien were entitled to believe
that foreclosure had to begin no later than May 15, 1987.

As

discussed in Point IV, infra, any extension of the lien through
judicial interpretation would only weaken the notice and further
highlight

the

constitutional

deficiencies

in

the

Utah

lien

statute.
(c)

As

discussed

in

Point

II,

infra,

Mickelson' s

foreclosure against Zions was also ineffective because Diehl, the
fee owner, was not a party to the original foreclosure claims.
Zions had no interest in the fee (except as a beneficiary under a
trust deed) at the time the foreclosure was commenced.
In summary, because the filing of the third party complaint
could not have been effective prior to November 25, 1987, it was
20

clearly untimely.

Even if the nunc pro tunc order is deemed

valid (which it is not), it would not have been effective prior
to

any

legally

supportable

limitation

date

under

§38-1-11.

Mickelson' s claim against Zions was commenced late and at a time
when the lien had already dissolved.

AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree

Development, 714 P. 2d 289 (Utah 1986).
II
MICKELSON' S FORECLOSURE ACTION AGAINST DIEHL
LUMBER WAS UNTIMELY.
The controlling statute on the issue of the untimeliness of
Mickelson's action against Diehl Lumber is U. C. A. §38-1-11.
Pursuant to the appellant7 s obligation to marshall facts,
the following facts are presented:
1.

At the time the action was commenced, Diehl Lumber was

the owner of the property.
2.

(F. F. 12, R. 581. )

The Complaint and the Amended Complaint filed by Diehl,

in paragraph 4, alleges that Mickelson filed a lien on May 7,
1986.

(R.

8,

this

foreclosed a trial. )

is

not

the

August

21

lien

which

was

This allegation was admitted by Mickelson.

(R. 11, Answer and Counterclaim, para. 2. )
3.

The Answer and Counterclaim filed by Mickelson makes no

reference to lien foreclosure.
4.

(R. 11. )

Mickelson provided labor, materials and equipment for

the construction and improvement of the Comtel
August

15,

1985 until

June

suspended by Mickelson . . . "

Building,

from

10, 1986, at which time work was
(F. F. 6, R. 580. )

in Part I, the June 10, 1986 date is disputed.)
21

(As discussed

5.

Mickelson' s contract was with Heritage, the owner of

the property.
6.

(R. 106. )

Mickelson' s

lien

was

recorded

on

August

21, 1986.

(F. F. 9, R. 581. )
7.

Mickelson' s motion for leave to amend its counterclaim

to allege lien foreclosure against Diehl was filed on February
26, 1988, (R. 312).
In addition to the summary of dates at page 11, supra, the
following date is significant.
February 1, 1988

motion for leave to amend
counterclaim to foreclose lien
against Diehl filed (R. 312. )

U.C.A. §38-1-11 sets forth two separate obligations which a
foreclosing lien claimant must meet in a timely manner:
first

sentence

requires

that

the

claimant

commence

his

1) the
court

action within 12 months after a) the completion of the "original
contract" or b) the suspension of work thereunder for 30 days;
2) the second sentence of 38-1-11 requires that the claimant file
a lis pendens within the same period and provides further that
the filing of this lis pendens is not required as to parties who
have actual knowledge of an action having been commenced.
No claim is made by appellant in this action regarding the
lis pendens.
The

one

jurisdictional.

year

limitation

set

forth

in

§38-1-11

is

It differs from a pure statute of limitations in

that it qualifies the right as well as the remedy.
the lifetime of a statutorily created remedy.
22

It measures

Therefore, at the

time the year expired, Mickelson's "rights and remedies under the
[lien]

statute

are

extinguished. "

A.A. A.

Fencing

Co.

v.

Raintree Development, 714 P. 2d 289 (Utah 1986).
At the time this action began, Diehl Lumber was the record
owner of the property.

(R.

4, 441. )

As such, they were a

necessary party to the foreclosure action.

Houser v. Smith, 56

Pac. 683 (Utah 1899); Ballard v. Lawyers Title of Ariz. . 552 P. 2d
455 (Ariz.App. 1976).

Prior to February of 1988, Diehl was not a

party to the foreclosure action.

Because of the unique nature of

mechanics

attempted

liens,

Mickelson's

amendment

of

his

counterclaim in February, 1988 to seek lien foreclosure for the
first time as against Diehl could not relate back to any prior
pleading
Cottonwood

against

Diehl.

United

Pacific

Insurance

Properties, Inc. , 750 P. 2d 907 at 908

Co.

v.

(Ariz. App.

1987) (amended complaint adding lien foreclosure count on same
facts as original complaint does not relate back under Rule 15);
Union Tank & Pipe Co. v. Mammoth, 25 P. 2d 262 (Cal.App. 1933).
This

conclusion

finds

particular

because of the AAA Fencing Co. , supra,
which

adopts

applicability

in

Utah

715 P. 2d at 290, case

a view of lien extinguishment

identical

to that

discussed in United Pacific, supra.

Indeed, the AAA Fencing Co.

case

court

is

cited

by

the

Arizona

on

the

issue

of

exti ngui s hment.
Prior to the time Mickelson sought to foreclose his lien
against Diehl, Mickelson had clearly proceeded to determine its
title to the personal property through replevin proceedings.
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In

fact, an order (R. 43) was entered by the court on December 26,
1986,

granting

a prejudgment

writ

of

replevin.

Mickelson' s

conduct manifested a conscious choice not to foreclose its lien
as against Diehl.
was untimely.
facts

His apparent change of mind in February, 1988

By February, 1988, under any interpretation of the

regarding last work on suspension, Mickelson' s lien had

long since expired.
As

a matter

of law,

the

foreclosure

proceedings

against

Diehl were untimely because the lien had been extinguished as a
matter of law, and the amended claim to foreclose against Diehl
should
lien

have been dismissed.
action

as

against

Mickelson

is

not

entitled

property.

Ballard, supra.

Furthermore,

Diehl

(the

fee

to

foreclose

because
owner)

his

lien

Mickelson' s
was

barred,

against

the

Ill
MICKELSON' S WORK WAS NOT LI ENABLE.
Not all work performed on property is lienable.
Vaughn,

747

P. 2d

1051

(Utah App.

1987).

In

Tripp v.

distinguishing

between real and personal property for lien purposes, the Utah
Supreme Court has adopted a tripartite test giving consideration
to annexation, adaption and intent on the part of owner to make
the work a permanent part of the realty.

Paul Mueller Co. v.

Cache Valley Dairy Ass' n. , 657 P. 2d 1279 (Utah 1982).
The facts relevant to this issue are as follows:
(a)

At trial, Mickelson testified

that all of the

items on Trial Exhibit 24 were readily removable and were not
24

fixtures.

He testified further that the light fixtures which he

installed

were

readily

unclasping them.
(b)

removable

simply

by

unplugging

and

(T. 97, 98; R. 86 is similar to Exhibit 24. )
At

trial,

Mickelson's

position was

that

"this

property never became fixtures because of the contract between
Heritage and Mr. Mickelson. " (T. 54. )
(c)

No other evidence was presented during the trial

on the issue of annexation, adaptation or intent.
Mickelson's

original

counterclaim

sought

virtually all of the materials he installed.

to

replevy

(R. 11, 17. )

He

filed a motion for a prejudgment writ of replevin asserting that
he

had

installed

"various

fixtures" into the property.

items

of

(R. 21. )

personal

property

and

Over vigorous objections,

the writ was granted and Diehl was required to post a redelivery
bond.

(R. 111. )
It is hornbook law that the burden of proof on the issue of

whether the work or material was lienable fell on Mickelson.

The

issue of whether the work was lienable was squarely before the
court, having been plead as a defense and being the first issue
addressed in appellant7 s trial brief.
the

only

evidence

presented

In response to the issue,

by Mickelson which

addressed

the

tripartite test in Mueller was that the equipment was readily
removable.
unclasping.

In large part, it could be removed by unplugging and
This undisputed evidence is contrary to any implied

finding of annexation.
The trial court determined early on that the equipment was
25

subject to a writ of replevin, manifesting the court's own belief
based

on Mickelson' s affidavits

that

the property

was

indeed

personalty.
In Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass7 n. . 657 P. 2d
1279

(Utah 1982) the supreme court upheld a determination that

removable

whey

drying

equipment

which

the

lien

installed was not a fixture and not lienable.

claimant

had

The Mueller case

was based upon an earlier Utah decision, King Brothers v. Utah
Dry Kiln, 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P. 2d 254 (1962), where the supreme
court observed that for a lien to attach:
" [I]t is necessary there be an annexation to
the land, or to some permanent structure upon
it, so that the materials in question can be
properly regarded as having become a part of
the realty; or a fixture appurtenant to it
(374 P. 2d at 256. )
In Mueller,

the installation which was determined

to be non-

lienable was a whey dryer attached to ducts, wiring, welding and
bolted to the floor.

The supreme court affirmed the trial courts

decision that the whey dryer was personal and not lienable.
In

Daniger

v.

Hunter,

251

P. 2d

353

(Cal.

1952),

the

California

court recognized that equipment such as stoves and

electrical

appliances, which

can be disconnected

primarily by

pulling a plug or unscrewing a plug, are not lienable.
On this threshold issue of whether the work was lienable,
the trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law.
Based

upon

materials
fixtures.

Mickelson' s

on

Exhibit

own

24 were

uncontradicted
readily

testimony,

removable

and

were

the
not

There being no evidence on any of the other factors
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necessary to prove lienable work, and where no other conclusion
can be drawn, the trial court erred in its apparent conclusion
that Mickelson' s work was lienable.
IV.
THE UTAH MECHANICS LIEN STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The mechanics lien at issue was recorded in August, 1986.
The Utah mechanics lien statute has been amended several times in
recent

years.

statute,

Appellant

U. C. A.

§38-1-1,

unconstitutional
States

contends
as

it

that

the

existed

mechanics

in August

under the Fourteenth Amendment

Constitution

and

Article

1,

Section

lien

1986, was

of the United
7 of

the

Utah

Constitution.
The determination of this issue requires a consideration of
i)

whether

the

constitutional
attachment

of

Utah

due
a

process

lien

property interest.

mechanics

lien

safeguards,

affects

a

statute

and

provides

ii) whether

constitutionally

the

significant

The analysis of these issues springs from

four cases decided by the United States Supreme Court:

Sniadach

v. Family Finance Corp. , 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S.

67

(1972);

Mitchell v. W. T.

Grant Co. , 416 U.S. 600

(1974); and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. , 419
U.S. 601 (1975).
These

cases

discuss

and present

applied to prejudgment remedies.

due process

concepts

as

The Maryland Court of Appeals,

in Barry Properties v. Fick Brothers Roofing Co. , 277 Md. 15, 353
A. 2d 222 (1976), while considering the same issues as presented
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in this appeal, made the following summation with respect to the
Supreme Court decisions:
"What we glean from Sniadach. Fuentes,
Mitchell and North Georgia Finishing is that,
lacking extraordinary
circumstances,
statutory prejudgment creditor remedies which
even temporarily deprive a debtor of a
significant property interest without notice
and an opportunity for a prior probablecause-type hearing are, as held in Fuentes,
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause unless
safeguards such as those mentioned in
Mitchell and North Georgia Finishing are
present and even then, although this is less
clear, the law may be invalid if the issues
underlying the seizure are not -susceptible to
uncomplicated documentary proof or if the
creditor does not have a present interest in
the property seized." 353 A. 2d at 231.
A.

The Utah mechanics lien statute provides no due process

protection.
The Utah lien statute, §38-1-1, et seq. , does not require
any of the following:
a)

that the lien be signed or verified
oath as to its truthfulness;

b)

that there be any notice to the owner of the
intent to file, or of the filing of the lien
(unless the lien claimant seeks costs and
attorneys' fees);

c)

an opportunity for the owner or the claimant
to be heard at any meaningful time or in any
meaningful manner either prior to or
subsequent to the attachment of the lien;

d)

any requirement for any protection for the
property owner if the lien is unsupportable;

e)

any supervision or control by any judicial
officer in the filing of the lien (the lien
attaches entirely without judicial action);

f)

the lien is not required to state the amount
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under

claimed or for what work or materials it is
claimed;
Prior to 1985, the Utah mechanics lien statute required that
liens

be

verified

requirement

was

under

oath.

recognized

on

The

several

significance
occasions

by

of

this

the

Utah

Supreme Court in First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d
919 (Utah 1981) and Graff v. Boise Cascade, 660 P. 2d 721 (Utah
1983).

The removal of this requirement meant that a claimant or

his authorized agent could file a lien without any requirement
that its truthfulness be sworn to.

Although Mickelson' s lien

was

fact does

"subscribed

and sworn to, " the

not affect the

constitutionality of the statute.
In the First Security, supra, case, the Utah Supreme Court
relied

heavily

upon

a decision

of the Alaska

Supreme Court,

H. A. M. S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors of Alaska, Inc., 563 P. 2d
258

(Alaska

1977) also

566

P. 2d

1012, which

considered

discussed the reasons why a lien must be verified.
court,

while

observing

that

verification

was

and

The Alaska
statutorily

required, considered that verification was also constitutionally
mandated: (563 P. 2d at 263)
...we
think
a construction
of
AS
34.35.070(c)(5), which requires that the
claim of lien be verified by the oath of the
claimant or other person having knowledge of
the fact is essential to the existence of the
lien, is mandated.
(Fn.
16-such an
interpretation is in line with our decisions
z

The 1989 amendment to §38-1-7 adds a requirement that a
lien be acknowledged for recording, but specifically removes any
such requirement for the time period involved in this action.
Mickelson's lien was "subscribed and sworn to."
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requiring due process notification and
opportunity to be heard in prejudgment
attachment cases...It takes notice of the
necessary balance between claims of lien and
due process requirements inherent in
unliquidated claims of lien filed against
real property. )
Given the significant
impact that the filing of a lien claim can
have against the owner of the subject
property, we think that strong policy reasons
underly the legislature' s determination that
claims of lien must be verified.
We think
the requirement of verificant [sic] is
reflective of the legislature' s awareness
that a claim of lien adversely affects the
title to the property and its alienability;
that the claim of lien can have an injurious
impact on the credit of the owner of the
property which is subject to the lien; and
that the claim of lien can be used as a
vehicle to coerce settlement from the owner
of the property.
In light of these very
important policy considerations there exists
a very reasonable basis for the legislature' s
determination that the significance of filing
a lien claim be made clear to the lien
c l a i m a n t through the requirement of
verification and the possibility of perjury
prosecution for verifying a false lien claim.
The absence of a verification requirement in the Utah act
flies in the face of the United States Supreme Court cases and
results in the total absence of due process on the most basic
issue - the truthfulness of the claim.

This absence is magnified

in Utah by the fact that a lis pendens, the notice required by
statute
again

to

other

without

foreclosure

claimants,

oath.

proceedings

As

is itself
such,

commenced

liens

a privileged
can

without

be

the

document,

recorded
claimant

and
ever

having to swear to the truthfulness of his lien.
The second due process defect in the Utah statute is that
the lien can attach without notice to the owner.
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(U.C.A. §38-1-

7(3) requires the notice to be mailed after filing, and if it is
not

mailed,

affected. )

only

the

right

to

recover

fees

and

costs

is

This absence of notice can result in liens being

recorded years before the owner has any notice.

For example, an

excavation subcontractor could complete work in the first month
of a two year project, be unpaid, file his lien right away (or
wait

until

the

"original

contract"

is

completed

two

years

later), and wait the 2 years until the project is completed plus
the one year allowed in §38-1-11 before suing to foreclose.

As

such, property could be encumbered for many years without actual
or record notice to the owner.

Notice goes to the very heart of

due process.
The
property

Utah

statute

owner

to

meaningful manner.

be

provides
heard

no

at

a

opportunity

for

meaningful

time

a

liened

or

in a

In Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco

Masons/ Sup. , 362 A. 2d 778 (Conn. 1975), vacated and remanded 423
U.S.

809 (1975) (for determination of whether decision was based

on federal
(1975);
Court

or state grounds),

cert. den.
considered

constitutional

reaffirmed,

Conn.

365 A. 2d 393

429 U.S. 889 (1976), the Connecticut Supreme
the

safeguard

significance
in

the

of

mechanics

a

hearing

lien process,

stated:
"For more than a century, the central meaning
of procedural due process has been clear.
' Parties whose rights are to be affected are
entitled to be heard; and in order that they
may enjoy that right they must first be
notified.
Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U. S. 223, 233
(citations
omitted)
It is
equally
fundamental that the right to notice and an
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as

a
and

opportunity to be heard ' must be granted at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. '
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85
S. Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62. (362 A. 2d at
781)
The Connecticut court reviewed the crucial role that a hearing
played in the U. S. Supreme Court cases, supra, observing that
while there was no requirement of a hearing prior to the filing,
there was clearly a requirement for an "early hearing. "
at 782.

362 A. 2d

At the same time, the Connecticut court distinguished

an Arizona case, Spielman-Ford, Inc. v. Hanson's, 379 F. Supp. 997
(D.Ariz) aff'd w. o. opin. 417 U.S. 901 (1974), on the basis that
Arizona limited the validity of a lien to a mere six (6) months
unless an action was brought to foreclose.

In Utah, however, the

time to foreclose could extend for a minimum of one year, and as
discussed supra, could actually be several years old before any
proceeding

is

commenced,

and

several

more

years

before

any

hearing could be had.
In Roundhouse,
that the

absence

hearing deprived

supra, the Connecticut

of any statutory
owners

Supreme

provision

Court held

for a meaningful

of their constitutional

rights to due

process under the Fourteenth Amendment and a due process clause
of the state constitution.
no

statutory

requirement

In Utah, as in Connecticut, there is
for

any

constitutionally

meaningful

hearing.
Each of the United States Supreme Court decisions, Fuentes,
Sniadach,

Mitchell,

and

North

Georgia,

supra,

refer

to

the

significance of a bond as a measure of protection to the owner.
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The Utah lien statute has no bond requirement.
These constitutional shortcomings become even more apparent
when the mechanics

lien statute

procedures for prejudgment relief.
all

of

the

constitutional

immediate hearing,

etc.

is

compared

to the Rule 64A

Rule 64A, U. R. C. P. , provides

safeguards

for

a debtor

- notice,

For example, to obtain a prejudgment

writ of replevin, as did Mickelson in this case, an evidentiary
hearing is conducted promptly, a bond required of the claimant,
and the debtor has the right to retain the property by posting
his

own

bond.

Claims

for

garnishment

or

attachment

of the

smallest amount are required to meet constitutional safeguards.
In lien proceedings, there is no preattachment hearing or any
hearing at all prior to trial, no right in the property owner to
bond over over the lien, no requirement that the claimant provide
a bond, and no judicial determination of probable entitlement.
While

all

of

the

procedural

safeguards

exist

in

Rule

64A

proceedings even for small claims, property worth, in this case,
hundreds of thousands of dollars can be encumbered by liens with
no safeguards.
Any one of the due process deficiencies which exist in the
Utah statute is in itself, sufficient to invalidate the statute.
Some states have upheld their mechanics lien statutes against due
process attacks.

None, however, (to our knowledge) have had the

broad range of constitutional defects which exist in the Utah
scheme, and are distinguishable on that basis alone.
recognized

None have

the broad range of property interests protected by
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state7 s

their

constitution' s due

process

clause.

Even

the

Connecticut statute which was struck down in Roundhouse, supra,
required that the amount of the lien be stated, an additional
safeguard not found in Utah.
deficiencies

are

When considered as a whole, the

overwhelming

and

provide

no

measure

of

procedural due process to owners of liened property.
Applied

to

this

case,

Mickelson' s lien,

contained no verification of the amount claimed.

while

verified,

Mickelson' s own

testimony attempted to contradict the verification of the last
date of work.

None of the other procedural safeguards mandated

by the constitution existed.

The lien and Mickelson' s conduct

with regard to it have resulted in a denial of due process to the
property owners.
B.

The

attachment

of

a mechanics

lien

is

a taking of

property sufficient in impose due process requirements.

It is

significant that the "taking" of property need not be total.

As

the United States Supreme Court observed in Fuentes, supra, "Any
significant

taking

of

property

by

the

state

is

within

the

purview of the Due Process Clause. " 407 U. S. at 86.
The Utah Supreme Court, in McGrew v. Industrial Commission,
85 P. 2d 608, 610 (Utah 1938) considered Article I, Section 7 of
the Utah Constitution and made the following observation:
The word "property" although in common
parlance applied to a tract of land or a
chattel, to a physical thing, means in its
legal signification only the rights of the
owner in relation to it.
Property is the
right of any person to possess, use, enjoy
and dispose of a thing. The term "property"
is often used to indicate the res, or subject
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of the property rather than the property
itself.
Rianev v. Chicago, 102 111. 64, 77.
"The words ' life' , ' liberty' , and ' property'
are constitutional terms, and are to be taken
in their broadest sense.
They indicate the
three great subdivisions of all civil right.
The term ' property' , in this clause, embraces
all valuable interests which a man may
possess outside of himself; that is to say,
outside of his life and liberty.
It is not
confined to mere tangible property but
extends to every species of vested right",
(citations omitted) I_c|.
Clearly

Utah

has

adopted

a

broad

definition

of

the

term

"property" in considering cases under Article 1, Section 7.
In Utah, as elsewhere, mechanic' s liens exist in derogation
of the common law and are purely a right created by statute.

A

lien, when filed in Utah, "...creates an encumbrance on property
that deprives the owner of his ability to convey clear title and
impairs his credit. "

First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, 631

P. 2d 919, 922 (Utah 1981).

A lien filed in Utah, by statute,

attaches to the interest of the owner from the date of first work
on the project by anyone, not just the claimant.
38-1-5.

U. C. A. §38-1-3,

A lien is given statutory priority over mortgages or

other interests which are recorded after the date of first work
even though no record notice of the lien may have been filed by
the lien claimant at the time the mortgage or other interest is
recorded.

U. C. A. §38-1-5.

While some courts have found that a taking of property does
not result

from the filing of a lien, Spielman-Ford,

Inc. v.

Hanson' s Inc. . 379 F. Supp. 997 (D.Ariz), aff'd w. o. opin. , 417
U.S.

901

(1974), these cases are readily distinguishable based
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upon the Utah statutory scheme and prior Utah case law.
The

better

reasoned

decisions

have

concluded

that

the

attachment of a mechanic' s lien does involve the taking of a
constitutionally

significant

property

interest.

In

Barry

Properties v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co. , 353 A. 2d 222 (Md.

1976),

the Maryland Supreme Court invalidated the Maryland mechanic' s
lien statute.

Rejecting the " de minimus" argument, the court

held that because the property owner was prevented from either
closing a permanent mortgage or obtaining a second mortgage on
the property' s equity as a result of a perfected mechanic' s lien,
such restriction constituted a significant interference with the
owner' s property rights.

The court reasoned:

Although possession will not be wrested from
the owner until a purchaser acquires title
through a foreclosure sale and the owner can
still legally alienate or further encumber
the property until that time, in reality,
since he no longer has unfettered title, not
only will it be extremely difficult for him
to do so, but additionally his equity will be
diminished to the extent of the lien. . .
Consequently, in light of the effect a
Maryland mechanic' s lien has on property, we
conclude that an owner is deprived of a
"significant property interest" when a lien
is imposed and thus, the limitations of due
process are applicable. Id,, at 228.
The Connecticut

Supreme Court, in Roundhouse

Construction

Corp. v. Telesco Masons' Supply Co. , supra, in holding that the
statutory procedure governing Connecticut' s mechanic' s liens was
unconstitutional, determined that the property interest involved
was

significant

in

severely restricts

that

the

recording

the opportunity
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of

a mechanic's

lien

for and the possibility of

alienation of the property.
In H, A, M. S, v. Electrical Contractors of Alaska, supra, 563
P. 2d at 263, the court focused on the fact that a lien adversely
affects title and alienability, that it has an injurious impact
on

credit,

and

settlement.

that

it

can be

used

as

a vehicle

to

coerce

As discussed previously, the Utah Supreme Court in

the First Security case, supra, has already adopted and agreed
with much of the reasoning of the H. A. M. S. case.
There can be little question but that the recording of a
lien affects many of the bundle of rights that emanate from the
ownership of property.

At a minimum, an owner or lender knows

that a lawsuit will likely follow with an unknown result.
the

unknown,

as

much

as

the

claim

itself,

that

It is

affects

the

property.
In other cases, liens

can be filed by subcontractors

to

coerce owners or general contractors into paying higher amounts
than may be owed simply because of the spectre the lien creates
and the absence of any efficient, meaningful way to remove the
lien short of a trial, and a trial which may be years away.
Applied to this case, a property worth hundreds of thousands
of dollars was affected and remained affected for years by a lien
worth

only

property.

a

small

percentage

of

the

overall

value

of

the

Yet, the lien interest is so significant that, if

successful, Mickelson can actually divest ownership.
The filing of a lien results in a significant taking of
property.
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The Utah Mechanics Lien Statute is unconstitutional on its
face.
of

Mickelson' s lien, in particular, resulted in a deprivation

a significant

property

process protection.
to

permit

interest

to

Diehl

without

any due

It would be constitutionally impermissible

Mickelson' s

lien

to

attach

to

the

property,

as

contemplated in §38-1-5, absent due process safeguards.
CONCLUSION
For each of the foregoing reasons, the decision of Judge
Sawaya should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of Zions
and Diehl.

The cause should be remanded- for a determination and

award of fees to appellants.
DATED this / / day of July, 1989.

COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorney for Diehl Lumber
Transportation, Inc. and
Zions First National Bank
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that
copies of the foregoing was mailed, postage
I /

day of July, 1989 to the following:
M. Richard Walker
M. Richard Walker & Associates
Attorney for Mickelson
4685 South Highland Drive, Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

da/Titledhl. brf
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M. Richard Walker
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

*-*

T-

£,

NOTICE OF LIEN
GLENN'S

SERVICE COMPANY, pursuant

to Utah Code Ann otated

Section 38-1-1, et.seq., hereby gives notice of a lien c laimed
and held against the following described real property, s ituate
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah:

J£ M ic
Beginning at a point 1574.07 feet South and 362.28
feet West from the Northeast corner of Section 12,
Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base &
Meridian, running thence South 35 deg. 09 , 23 M West
452.68 feet; thence Southwesterly 215.69 feet alon g
the arc of a 369.26 foot raduis curve to the right
(Chord bears South 51 deg. 53'28" West 212.63 feet);
thence Northwesterly 377.97 feet along the arc of a
2914.73 foot radius curve to the left (Chord bears
North 12 deg. 21'24w East 377.71 feet); thence North 8
deg 57f31" East 37.06 feet, thence North 5 deg. 48,05"
East 107.96 feet; thece North 29 deg. 41" East 43.14
feet; thence South 73 deg. 52 l 58 w East 38.58 feet;
thence South 54 deg. 13'29" East 128.50 feet to the
point of beginning.
Reputed/Record owner: Heritage Corporation
Labor/Material provided to: Heritage Corporation
First Labor/Material provided on or about: 08/15/85
Last Labor/Material provided on or about:
05/15/86
DATED this 3 /
day of August, 1986.
CLAIMANT:
Glenn's Service Company

i

By: ^leng^j'. tficfcelson
Owner
STATE OF UTAH

)

) ss.
County of Salt Lake)
SUBSCRIBED

jtm

AND

986

SWORN

to

before

me

this

' I -

Residing at: \ (

:

U17

NOT/iRY PUBLIC

•

^Z

i

CD

• •*" t

M.

Rloh«rd

W«lk#r

Bar N o .
3362
M. R I C H A R D WALKER

NOV 2 5 1987
& ASSOCIATES

Attorney for Plaintiff
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 278-4747
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DIEHL LUMBER TRANSPORTATION, INC.
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)

NUNC PRO TUNC
ORDER

)

GLEN J. MICKELSON dba
GLEN'S SERVICE COMPANY,
Defendant,

)
)
)

Judge:

Sawaya

GLEN J. MICKELSON dba
GLEN'S SERVICE COMPANY,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.

)

HERITAGE CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, COMTEL, a Utah
corporation, AMERICAN WEST MORTGAGE
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,
ZION'S FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a Utah
corporation, and FAR WEST
SAVINGS & LOAN,
Third Party Defendants.

Civil No. C86-8213

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

************************************************

The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on
the 29th day of June, 1987, pursuant to Defendant's Motion for
Leave to File Third Party Complaint, and the Court being fully

• I O T P

IT

and f i l e

IS

HEREBY

ORDERED

that

Defendant

is hereby

granted

t h e T h i r d Pa-rty C o m p l a i n t h e r e i n . ; ^ / f e ^ ( ^ ci$ of dj/JL

DATED t h i s

A ^

day o f

//fr?/"

'

,

to amej)d

ef

fi/cv-c

1987.

BY THE COURT:

ATTEST
H. EXXON H1NDLEY _
Ctof>

^^^
^

•

O

V

^

A

/

i^JAMES S." SAWAYA
D i s t r i c t Judge

0«(ptity Oerk

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on this
day of
, 1987, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER,
postage prepaid, in the United States mail, to the following:
Randy B. Coke
Attorney at Law
BEASLIN, BYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Secretary

- 2 -

A'^1

m

o\<S-v^

0

». ^ i ^ ^

Annul.

Type of hearing: Div.

P. Atty: r n ^ n k j J i r J
D. Atty: _ N k
Sworn & Examined:
Pltf:
Deft:.
Others:

^

j

cJL

C?~^^--CS2/c^
C A S E N O : Sm

^<

Supp. Order,
Other,
OSC.
Stipulation.
Summons,
UAJL,H^r^^/^
Waiver
Publication.
•
Default of Pltf/Deft E n j e r e c L - ^

Dat^F^^UYN^l OR >
Judge;
Clerk:"
Reporter:
Bailiff: _

&$1

>^SctUjC^\Qy^

VJN^M^

ORDERS:
•
•

Custody Evaluation Ordered
Visitation Rights

n
•
n

_
Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $
x
Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $
_ Per Month/Year
Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office:,

•

•

Custody Awarded To

•

Per Month
Alimony Waived

n

Atty. fees to the
Home To:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
!~J
•
•

Furnishings To:
. Automobile To:
Each Party Awarded their Personal Property
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children
Restraining Order Entered Against
Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $_
90-Day Waiting Period is Waived
Divorce Granted To
As
Decree To Become Final: • Upon Entry
LJ 3-Month Interlocutory
Former Name of

•

Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court
orders
/
shall issue for Deft.
Returnable
Bail.

•

Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor,
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice.

•

B§sed on
on written
written stipulation
stipulation of
of respective
respective counsel/motion
counsel/motion or
of n
Plaintiff's
counseL coun
court oraers
orders
B^sed
a i n t i p s counseL

_ in the amount of _

mT

•

Deferred

Is Restored

—> °

Third Judicial District

M. Richard Walker
Bar No. 3362
M. RICHARD WALKER & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 278-4747

JAN 2 6 1989
SALT LAKE COUNTY,

tty X,( . ^ J ^ v S ] ^ L \ J*

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DIEHL LUMBER TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
Plaintiff,

1
>
]1
I

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]

vs.

GLENN J. MICKELSON dba
GLENN'S SERVICE COMPANY,

]>

Judge:

Sawaya

Defendant,
GLENN J. MICKELSON dba
GLENN'S SERVICE COMPANY,
Third Party Plaintiff,

]
]'

Civil No. C86-8213

!

vs.
HERITAGE CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, COMTEL, a Utah
corporation, AMERICAN WEST
MORTAGE CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, ZIONS FIRST
NATIONAL BANK, a Utah corporation,
and FAR WEST SAVINGS & LOAN,

]

Third Party Defendants.
************************************************************

The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial before
the above entitled Court on the 23rd day of August, 1988, the
Honorable James S. Sawaya, District Judge, presiding, the
Plaintiff
and
Third
Party
Defendants
being
present and
represented by their attorneys, Richard A. Rappaport and Keith W.
Meade, and the Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff, Glenn Mickelson,
being present in person and represented by his attorney, M.
Richard Walker, and the matter having been fully tried,

presented, argued and submitted and the Court being fully advised
in the premises, hereby makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That this action involves the construction of a building
located at 57 West Vine Street, Murray, Utah, referred to as the
"Comtel Building".
2.
The "Comtel Building" was constructed by Heritage
Corporation (HERITAGE) as owner and general contractor, on behalf
of Comtel, Inc., the Lessee of the premises, for whom the
building was being constructed.
That HERITAGE, as buyer,
acquired the property on a Uniform Real Estate Contract from the
Redevelopment Agency of Murray City, dated August 7, 1985,
recorded August 28, 1985, in Book 5685 at Page 1870.
3. The construction financing was obtained by HERITAGE from
American West Mortgage Corporation, who secured the funding by
virtue of a Trust Deed dated March 29, 1985, and recorded As
Entry No. 4069667.
4.
On the same date of March 29, 1985, American West
Mortgage Corporation assigned its interest in the Trust Deed to
Far West Savings and Loan, said assignment being recorded April
12, 1985 as Entry No. 4072966 at Book 5644, Page 2959.
5. The Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff, MICKELSON, was
hired by HERITAGE to provide electrical materials, labor and
equipment (in the construction of the COMTEL BUILDING), purusant
to a written subcontract agreement dated June 24, 1985.
6.
MICKELSON provided labor, materials and equipment for
the construction and improvement of the COMTEL BUILDING, from
August 15, 1985 until June 10, 1986, at which time work was
suspended
by
MICKELSON,
based
upon
the
fact
that
the
Owner/General Contractor (HERITAGE) had failed to make payment of
the obligations due and owing under the Subcontract Agreement.
7. That at the time of suspension of work on June 10, 1986,
there remained due and owing to MICKELSON the sum of $27,026.46.
8. That on or about the 3rd day of June, 1986, the said Far
West Savings and Loan, filed for record its Notice of Default and
2
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Election of Sale, recorded as Entry No. 4255556 at Book 5774,
Page 1623.
9. That on or about the 21st day of August, 1986, the said
MICKELSON filed for record his Notice of Lien recorded as Entry
No. 4299656 at Book 5806, Page 49.
10. That thereafter on September 5, 1986, the said Far West
Savings and Loan, gave its Notice of Trustee's Sale, scheduling
the sale of the property at Trustee's Sale on October 7, 1986.
11.
That thereafter on or about October 8, 1986, Zions
First National Bank (ZIONS) purchased the interest of Far West
Savings and Loan, as recorded on the public records of Salt Lake
County as Entry No. 4328646 and 4328647.
12.
That on or about the 27th day of October, 1986, the
Plaintiff (DIEHL) puchased the property (COMTEL BUILDING) from
ZIONS, and DIEHL claims to be the owner of the property referred
to as the COMTEL BUILDING.
13.
The construction of the COMTEL BUILDING was basically
completed on July 17, 1986, except as to work suspended for
failure to pay.
14.
In November 1984, the Owner/General Contractor,
HERITAGE, retained the architect, Robert Tuttle, who in December
1984, completed the "design development plot plan, floor plans,
elevations and presentation drawings", delivering the same to
HERITAGE prior to January 18, 1985.
15.
That prior to January 16, 1985, DeMass & Associates
completed the boundary survey of the property and rough-staking
of the site for the building, using bright orange and yellow
flags, for the purpose of identifying the building site so that
excavation and leveling of the building site could be done by Bay
Construction.
16. That in January 1985 HERITAGE hired Bay Construction to
excavate and rough grade the building site for the COMTEL
BUILDING.
17. That on approximately January 15, 1985, pursuant to his
agreement with HERITAGE, Byron Young (BAY Construction) brought
onto the "Comtel" job site a large D-8 Cat, with which he
3
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commenced work on the project, excavating and grading a level
platform the approximate size of the building to rough grade,
upon which the building was to be built.
18. That as part of the work, Bay Construction "ripped" the
slag on the site, cutting approximately 3-4 feet deep on the
north end and filling with the excess on the South end of the
building site, working the D-8 Cat 19 3/4 hours and billing
approximately $2,000.00 for the work completed.
19. That the Owner/General Contractor (HERITAGE) considered
the work by Bay Construction
to be the commencement of
construction, and knew that it was done before the Trust Deed in
favor of American West Mortgage Corporation was recorded, but did
so because of the availability of Bay Construction to work, and
the time contraints imposed by his permanent financing lender.
20.
That the leveled "platform" for the building and the
survey stakes with "orange and yellow flagging" were existing and
clearly observable at the date on which American West Mortgage
Corporation recorded its Trust Deed on March 29, 1985.
21. On June 12, 1987, the Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff,
MICKELSON, filed its Verified Third Party Complaint, seeking to
foreclose its lien.
22. That leave of Court to file the Third Party Complaint
was given by stipulation of the Plaintiff's attorney and a
subsequently signed Nunc Pro Tunc Order of the Court.
At the
time of filing of said Third Party Complaint, the Plaintiff,
DIEHL, was the only other party to the action.
23. That the matters and issues tried and considered by the
Court are claims alleged by Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff,
MICKELSON, in his Third Party Complaint claiming:
a. A valid lien on real property for labor and material
furnished. The critical issue being priority of the claimed lien
over the trust deed, which was foreclosed and the interest
thereunder assigned to Third Party Defendant Zions First National
Bank.
The date of commencement of construction being the
dispositve issue, and Third Party Plaintiff claiming that the
commencement to do work or furnish materials as predating the
4
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date of recording the trust deed.
b. A right to remove material installed in the building
pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement between Third Party
Plaintiff and the contractor, HERITAGE, which provided that
Plaintiff retains title to materials installed and a right to
remove same if not paid in full.
24. The Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff, MICKELSON, claims
for attorney's fees under the lien law, and it was stipulated at
the conclusion of the trial that if Third Party Plaintiff was
successful, attorney's fees could be submitted on affidavit
subject to cross examination, by the Third Party Defendants.
25.
That the Third Party Plaintiff by affidavit claims
pursuant to UCA 1953 §38-1-17, that a reasonable attorney's fee
is the amount of $9,450,00.
The Court having made it Findings of Fact, does hereby make
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That the Third Party Plaintiff, MICKELSON, pursuant to a
written subcontract with the Owner/General Contractor, Heritage
Corporation, provided labor and materials in the construction,
building and improvement upon the land locally known as the
Comtel Building, located at 57 West Vine Street, and more
particularly described as follows:
Beginning at a point 1574.07 feet South and
362.28 feet West from the Northeast corner of
Section 12, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, running thence South
35o09'23,, West 452.68 feet; thence Southwesterly
215.69 feet along the arc of a 369.26 foot
radius curve to the right (Chord bears South
51053'28"
West
212.63
feet);
thence
Northeasterly 377.97 feet along the arc of a
2914.73 foot radius curve to the left (Chord
bears North 12°21'24n East 377.71 feet); thence
North 8°57'31" East 37.06 feet, thence North
5°48'05" East 107.96 feet; thence North 29°41'
East 43.14 feet; thence South 73°52'58" East
38.58 feet; thence South 54°13'29,t East 128.50
feet to the point of beginning.
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2.
That there remains due and owing to Third Party
Plaintiff for said labor and materials the sum of $27,026,46
3.
That the lien filed by the Third Party Plaintiff,
MICKELSON, is' a valid and legal lien as provided in Title 38,
Chapter 1, UCA 1953, as amended.
4.
That the Third Party Plaintiff suspended work on the
Comtel Building on June 10, 1986, because the Owner/General
Contractor (HERITAGE) failed to pay the amounts past due and
owing to the Third Party Plaintiff,
5. That the last work for which a lien was filed, was done
by Third Party Plaintiff on or about May 19, 1986, although other
work was performed up to June 10, 1986.
6.
That the Third Party Plaintiff timely filed its Notice
of Lien on or about August 21, 1986, and within 100 days after
furnishing the last labor or materials as required under §38-1-7
UCA 1953, as amended.
7.
That the Third Party Plaintiff timely commenced an
action to enforce its lien:
"within twelve months after the completion of
the original contract, or the suspension of work
thereunder for a period of thirty days."
as provided in §38-1-11 UCA 1953, as amended.
8. That the work performed on January 16, 1985, by Bay
Construction satisfied the requirement of the statute, §38-1-5
UCA 1953, as amended, as being the "commencement to do work or
furnish
materials
on
the
ground
for
the
structure
or
improvement".
9.
That the Third Party Plaintiff's lien relates back to
and takes effect as of the time work was commenced on January 16,
1985, and has priority over the Trust Deed of American West
Mortgage Corporation as assigned to Far West Savings and Loan;
has priority over the interests of Zions First National Bank who
acquired the property through the Trustee's Sale; and has
priority over the interests of Diehl Lumber and Transporation,
Inc. who acquired the property from Zions First National Bank.
10.

Third Party Plaintiff is entitled to the right to
6
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foreclose the mechanics lien claimed as prayed.
11.
Third Party Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the
proceeds of the foreclosure sale the following:
a. Principal - $27,026.46.
b.
Interest at 10% per annum from the date of each
unpaid invoice to the date of Judgment in the amount of
$7,719.63.
c.

For attorney's fees of $9,450.00.

d.

For costs of court in the amount of $732.10.

e. Any amounts derived from the sale over and above the
above amounts should be paid to the Clerk of the Court, for the
use and benefit of the Plaintiff or the Third Party Defendant,
Zions First National Bank, as their interests may appear.
12.
That the Third Party Defendant's title retaining
agreement does not satisfy the requirements of the statute and no
valid security interest was created by the same therefore Third
Party Defendant should not hajz^ the right to remove personal
property from the premises.
DATED this J^?/£
day nfJ^^mU*~>r
198^
B)

J^AiJEB^S. SAWAYA
District Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
4 I hereby certify that on this
J^H^ day of ^yOM
•
r
1 9 8 ^ I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregbirfgfe"FTNDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, postage prepaid, in the United
States mail, to the following:
Richard A. Rappaport
Keith W. Meade
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

^cvJoOA^^^/x

JLi

Secretary
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Third Judictai Diotrtct

M. Richard Walker
Bar No. 3362
M. RICHARD WALKER & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 278-4747
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U«Lu^ Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DIEHL LUMBER TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
GLENN J. MICKELSON dba
GLENN'S SERVICE COMPANY,

Judge:

Sawaya

Defendant,
GLENN J. MICKELSON dba
GLENN'S SERVICE COMPANY,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C86-8213

9>l«5Mfc3
\-30-%c\-<5o0

HERITAGE CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, COMTEL, a Utah
corporation, AMERICAN WEST
MORTAGE CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, ZIONS FIRST
NATIONAL BANK, a Utah corporation,
and FAR WEST SAVINGS & LOAN,
Third Party Defendants.

The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial on the
23rd day of August, 1988, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, District
Judge, presiding, the Third Party Plaintiff being represented by
his attorney, M. Richard Walker, and the Plaintiff and Third
Party Defendants being represented by their attorneys, Richard A.
Rappaport and Keith W. Meade; and the Court having considered the
evidence and counsel having argued the case and submitted the
same to the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the
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premises and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Lawf now therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed by stipulation of the
parties.
2.
Third Party Plaintiff Mickelson's Mechanics Lien is
deemed to be a valid and legal lien and Third Party Plaintiff,
Mickelson, is hereby awarded the right to foreclose the
Mechanic's Lien as prayed.
3.
That the property to be foreclosed is located in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, locally known as 57 West Vine Street
and more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at a point 1574.07 feet South and
362.28 feet West from the Northeast corner of
Section 12, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, running thence South
35o09'23" West 452.68 feet; thence Southwesterly
215.69 feet along the arc of a 369.26 foot
radius curve to the right (Chord bears South
S l ^ ^ "
West
212.63
feet);
thence
Northeasterly 377.97 feet along the arc of a
2914.73 foot radius curve to the left (Chord
bears North 12°21'24w East 377.71 feet); thence
North 8°57'31" East 37.06 feet, thence North
SMS'OS" East 107.96 feet; thence North 29°41'
East 43.14 feet; thence South 73°52'58 n East
38.58 feet; thence South 54°13'29M East 128.50
feet to the point of beginning.
4.
That the interests the Plaintiff and Third Party
Defendant's may have in the above property is inferior and
subordinate to the Lien of the Third Party Plaintiff.
5.
The Third Party Plaintiff is granted judgment for
$27,026.46, plus $50.00 for the costs of preparing said Lien,
costs of Court in the sum of $732.10, together with interest
thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of each unpaid
invoice until the date of Judgment in the sum of $7,719.63.
6. Third Party Plaintiff is awarded a reasonable attorney's
fee in the sum of $9,450.00.
7. The Sheriff of Salt Lake County is directed to forthwith
sell the above described property pursuant to §38-1-17 UCA 1953,
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as amended, and that the proceeds of said sale shall be applied
to satisfy the above sums of money due and owing to the Third
Party Plaintiff, Mickelson, together with the expenses of sale,
and that the surplus, if any, be turned over to the clerk of this
Court for the use and benefit orfr^the Third Party Defendants as
their interest may appear,
( J) .
DATED this *Z?/7
day of/Taa&Riwbar, 198£^
BY T

S. SAWAYA
District Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this ^Z -"" day of
\)GL.C^
1988, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT,
postage prepaid, in the United States mail, to the following:
Richard A. Rappaport
Keith W. Meade
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

j^>#j\l&-aAj0L
Secretary
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